These secret, wartime plans are the prototypes for what would become a key component of the D-Day invasion. Dubbed by historians as one of the greatest military engineering achievements of all time, the "Mulberry Harbours" were the brainchild of Winston Churchill, and the design triumph of Welsh engineer Hugh Iorys Hughes (1902-1977). After the evacuation of Dunkirk in 1940, Allied forces were unable to mount a counter-invasion of the European mainland without access to a port large enough to handle supplies to support the troops. Capturing an existing port like Le Havre would have been difficult, if not impossible. Finding a solution to this problem, Allied leaders knew, would be imperative to defeating the Nazis.
As a member of the War Cabinet during the First World War, Churchill had proposed a mobile port in support of amphibious operations to capture two islands off the coast of Germany. Though shelved at the time, the plan was resurrected during the Second World War by Hughes, at that time living in London. In 1941-42, he contacted the War Office to propose construction of a mobile port that could be ferried across the Channel for an invasion of Nazi-occupied Europe. After Hughes' brother, a commander in the Royal Navy, brought the idea to the attention of more senior officers, it caught fire. On May 30, 1942, Churchill, who was already favorably disposed to the idea of a mobile port, sent a famous directive to Admiral Mountbatten, head of Combined Operations: "Piers for use on beaches. They must float up and down with the tide. The anchor problem must be mastered. Let me have the best solution worked out. Don't argue the matter. The difficulties will argue for themselves."
Hughes was chosen to spearhead the project, according to a June 1, 1942 "Top Secret" memorandum. His mandate was to prepare plans for "prototypes of landing piers to be towed across the Channel and sunk into place." The piers were to be "capable of carrying the heaviest tanks and artillery ... [and] of being towed from one assault beach to another...." He would also have to account for projected tidal and wind conditions at the beaches in France.
The present set of plans was drawn up by Hughes during an intensive seven-week period, from June 17 to August 6, 1942. These are his retained copies (one or more others having been delivered to the War Office shortly after their completion). Tasked with validating the plans, Hughes selected the estuary of the River Conwy ("Conwy Morfa") in North Wales as a test site. In late 1942 and early 1943, he recruited almost a thousand workers for the construction and testing of the mobile harbors. The project was so secret that even the men working on it were unaware of its true purpose.
Hughes devised two types of construction, code-named "Hippos" (concrete caissons that could be sunk/anchored in place as pier-heads) and "Crocs" (steel roadways elevated over the Hippos, linking them together). These were subsequently towed to another secret test site in Scotland, at Garlieston, Wigtownshire. There, Hughes's efforts were integrated with prototypes developed by two other teams: the Royal Navy Directorate of Miscellaneous Weapons Development (DMWD) and TN5 (Transportation 5), the unit responsible for command of the mobile port project. The work at Garlieston included development and testing of breakwaters needed to make the port and its roadways usable under various tides and weather conditions. Hughes's Hippo plan was ultimately modified into a design code-named "Phoenix"; these caissons would be sunk for breakwater in Normandy on D-Day. After the war, the independent efforts of the teams prior to the Garlieston collaboration would lead to competing claimants to the title of design "creator." Though there is no doubt that the project was a team effort, Hughes' plans appear to be the earliest prototypes for the project.
Code-named "Mulberry Harbours" or "Mulberries," the mobile harbors were completed by May 1944 and successfully launched with the use of tug boats soon after. They were, as Churchill later wrote, "to form a principal part of the great plan." During D-Day operations, Mulberry A was installed at Omaha Beach, for American invasion forces; Mulberry B was set up at Arromanches (Gold Beach) for the British and Canadians. Only two weeks after D-Day, a massive storm destroyed Mulberry A. Mulberry B also sustained some damage, but was reinforced to keep it operable at least until the end of October. As it turned out, Mulberry B was left open until November 19. Hughes was involved throughout, making adjustments and reinforcements to enhance the usefulness of the monumental undertaking.
The Mulberry Harbors made it possible, after the first wave of assault troops had established a bridgehead on the beach, for the continued supply of troops and supplies into that bridgehead, and through the months of conflict of the Battle of Normandy. The volume of forces and supplies was immense. By October the harbors at Le Havre and Cherbourg were up and running, and the Mulberry harbors had served their purpose. The enemy's perspective on their value is especially revealing. At the Nuremberg Trials, Albert Speer, former Nazi minister of armaments, was forced to admit that the Germans' costly, two-year effort to construct Atlantic defenses had been "brought to nothing because of an idea of simple genius." These plans represent the genesis of that idea.
In May 1942, Churchill sent a famous directive to Admiral Mountbatten, head of Combined Operations: "Let me have the best solution worked out. Don't argue the matter. The difficulties will argue for themselves." Hughes was chosen to spearhead the project, and drew up the plans (those offered at Bonhams are his own copies), which were tested and went into service off the Normandy beaches.
As a member of the War Cabinet during the First World War, Churchill had proposed a mobile port in support of amphibious operations to capture two islands off the coast of Germany. Though shelved at the time, the plan was resurrected during the Second World War by Hughes, at that time living in London. In 1941-42, he contacted the War Office to propose construction of a mobile port that could be ferried across the Channel for an invasion of Nazi-occupied Europe. After Hughes' brother, a commander in the Royal Navy, brought the idea to the attention of more senior officers, it caught fire. On May 30, 1942, Churchill, who was already favorably disposed to the idea of a mobile port, sent a famous directive to Admiral Mountbatten, head of Combined Operations: "Piers for use on beaches. They must float up and down with the tide. The anchor problem must be mastered. Let me have the best solution worked out. Don't argue the matter. The difficulties will argue for themselves."
Hughes was chosen to spearhead the project, according to a June 1, 1942 "Top Secret" memorandum. His mandate was to prepare plans for "prototypes of landing piers to be towed across the Channel and sunk into place." The piers were to be "capable of carrying the heaviest tanks and artillery ... [and] of being towed from one assault beach to another...." He would also have to account for projected tidal and wind conditions at the beaches in France.
The present set of plans was drawn up by Hughes during an intensive seven-week period, from June 17 to August 6, 1942. These are his retained copies (one or more others having been delivered to the War Office shortly after their completion). Tasked with validating the plans, Hughes selected the estuary of the River Conwy ("Conwy Morfa") in North Wales as a test site. In late 1942 and early 1943, he recruited almost a thousand workers for the construction and testing of the mobile harbors. The project was so secret that even the men working on it were unaware of its true purpose.
Hughes devised two types of construction, code-named "Hippos" (concrete caissons that could be sunk/anchored in place as pier-heads) and "Crocs" (steel roadways elevated over the Hippos, linking them together). These were subsequently towed to another secret test site in Scotland, at Garlieston, Wigtownshire. There, Hughes's efforts were integrated with prototypes developed by two other teams: the Royal Navy Directorate of Miscellaneous Weapons Development (DMWD) and TN5 (Transportation 5), the unit responsible for command of the mobile port project. The work at Garlieston included development and testing of breakwaters needed to make the port and its roadways usable under various tides and weather conditions. Hughes's Hippo plan was ultimately modified into a design code-named "Phoenix"; these caissons would be sunk for breakwater in Normandy on D-Day. After the war, the independent efforts of the teams prior to the Garlieston collaboration would lead to competing claimants to the title of design "creator." Though there is no doubt that the project was a team effort, Hughes' plans appear to be the earliest prototypes for the project.
Code-named "Mulberry Harbours" or "Mulberries," the mobile harbors were completed by May 1944 and successfully launched with the use of tug boats soon after. They were, as Churchill later wrote, "to form a principal part of the great plan." During D-Day operations, Mulberry A was installed at Omaha Beach, for American invasion forces; Mulberry B was set up at Arromanches (Gold Beach) for the British and Canadians. Only two weeks after D-Day, a massive storm destroyed Mulberry A. Mulberry B also sustained some damage, but was reinforced to keep it operable at least until the end of October. As it turned out, Mulberry B was left open until November 19. Hughes was involved throughout, making adjustments and reinforcements to enhance the usefulness of the monumental undertaking.
The Mulberry Harbors made it possible, after the first wave of assault troops had established a bridgehead on the beach, for the continued supply of troops and supplies into that bridgehead, and through the months of conflict of the Battle of Normandy. The volume of forces and supplies was immense. By October the harbors at Le Havre and Cherbourg were up and running, and the Mulberry harbors had served their purpose. The enemy's perspective on their value is especially revealing. At the Nuremberg Trials, Albert Speer, former Nazi minister of armaments, was forced to admit that the Germans' costly, two-year effort to construct Atlantic defenses had been "brought to nothing because of an idea of simple genius." These plans represent the genesis of that idea.
In May 1942, Churchill sent a famous directive to Admiral Mountbatten, head of Combined Operations: "Let me have the best solution worked out. Don't argue the matter. The difficulties will argue for themselves." Hughes was chosen to spearhead the project, and drew up the plans (those offered at Bonhams are his own copies), which were tested and went into service off the Normandy beaches.